UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-17-2010

State v. Folk Respondent's Brief Dckt. 36244

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Folk Respondent's Brief Dckt. 36244" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1329.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1329

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

I
'I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID
H
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
JONATHAN EARL FOLK,

Defendant-Appellant.

opy

NO. 36244

)

-------------------------)
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

HONORABLE JON J. SCHINDURLING
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

DIANE M. WALKER
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

FILED - COpy
JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
BOise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

I

I

ALI]

ISupreme

I 1 2010

I
I

COU'l

_~(,Vit w. o\ope!i$_(

EI\:.nol)~ATSIl~_.

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT -APPELLANT

_

I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID

H
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
JONATHAN EARL FOLK,
Defendant-Appellant.

opy

NO. 36244

---------------------------)
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

HONORABLE JON J. SCHINDURLING
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

DiANE M. WALKER
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT -APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings ........................ 1
ISSUES ............................................................................................................5
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................6

I.

I
I
I

I
I

Folk Has Failed To Demonstrate Any Violation Of
His Statutory Or Constitutional Rights To A Speedy Trial. .......... 6
A.

Introduction ......................................................................6

B.

Standard Of Review ......................................................... 6

C.

Folk Has Failed To Preserve The Argument
That His State And Federal Constitutional
Rights To A Speedy Trial Were Violated ......................... 7

D.

Folk Has Failed To Show His Statutory
Speedy Trial Right Was Violated ................................... 10
1.

Folk's Claim That The District Court
Violated His Statutory Speedy Trial
Right Is Moot.. ..................................................... 10

2.

Folk's Request For A Continuance Within
The Six-Month Statutory Period Made His
Statutory Speedy Trial Right Inapplicable ........... 12

3.

The District Court Correctly Determined
There Was Good Cause To Continue
Folk's Trial Beyond Six Months ........................... 14
a.

Law Relevant To Statutory "Good
Cause" ...................................................... 14

it
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

b.

II.

III.

IV.

The Trial Court Had Good Cause To
Continue Folk's TriaL ................................ 15

Folk Has Failed To Show That His Constitutional
Right To Confront His Accuser Was Violated ........................... 21
A.

Introduction ....................................................................21

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 21

C.

Any Assertion That Folk's Confrontation
Rights Were Violated Because T.R.'s
Testimony Was Presented Outside Folk's
Presence Is Waived Under The Invited Error
Doctrine ......................................................................... 22

D.

Folk Has Failed To Show The Trial Court
Erred In Determining T.R. Could Testify
Outside Folk's Presence Because He Would
Suffer Serious Emotional Trauma And Adversely
Impact His Ability To Communicate ............................... 23

E.

Folk's Arguments That The Trial Court Violated
His Sixth Amendment Right To Confrontation
By Limiting The Manner And Duration Of His
Cross-Examination Of T.R. Are Not Supported
With Authority And Should Not Be Considered
On Appeal ......................................................................26

Folk Has Failed To Show That His Constitutional
Right To Self-Representation Was Violated ............................. 27
A.

Introduction ....................................................................27

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 28

C.

Folk Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred
By Ruling That His Standby Counsel Would
Personally Cross-Examine T. R. By Asking
Questions Prepared By Folk .......................................... 28

Folk Has Failed To Demonstrate The Trial Court
Erred By Its Answer To The Jury's Question
About Instruction Sixteen .......................................................... 32

ii

I
I

~=-

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

v.

A.

Introduction .................................................................... 32

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 34

C.

Folk Has Failed To Show Any Error, Much
Less Prejudicial Error, In The Trial Court's
Clarifying Instruction ...................................................... 34

Folk Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative
Error Doctrine Applies To This Case ........................................ 36

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 36
CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE ......................................................................... 37

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE

CASES

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972} ...................................................... 8,14, 19
Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429,816 P.2d 986 (1991} ................................... 10
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004} ..................................................... 25
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975} .......................................................... 28
Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir.1995} ........................................ 30, 31, 32
Idaho Schools For Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. Of Educ.,
128 Idaho 276,912 P.2d 644 (1996) ............................................ 10
LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 937 P.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1997) ......................... 36
Loomis v. Killeen 135 Idaho 607,21 P.3d 929 (Ct. App. 2001} .......................... 12
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990} ....................................................... 23,24
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) .................................................... 24
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984} ............................................ 29, 30, 32

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
~J

Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 16 P.3d 937 (Ct. App. 2000) .............................. 34
Packard v. Joint School Dist. No. 171, 104 Idaho 604,
661 P.2d 770 (Ct. App. 1983) ....................................................... 35
State v. Amerson, 129 Idaho 395,925 P.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1996) ........................ 7
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816,864 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1993} ....................... 22
State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 136 P.3d 350 (Ct. App. 2006) ....................... 7, 8
State v. Bacon, 117 Idaho 679, 791 P.2d 429 (1990) ........................................ 11
State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191,16 P.3d 288 (Ct. App. 2000} .......................... 36
State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6,232 P.3d 327, 2010 WL 1632625 (2010} ............ 10
. State v. Brown, 53 Idaho 576, 26 P.2d 131 (1933) ............................................ 35

iv

I
I
··~

"",

I
I
I
I
I

State v. Burchard, 123 Idaho 382,848 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1993) ...................... 11
State v. Caudhill, 109 Idaho 222, 706 P.2d 456 (1985) ...................................... 22
State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 16 P.3d 931 (2000) ............................................ 14
State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 118 P.3d 160 (Ct. App. 2005) ...................... 10,19
State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834,718 P.2d 1272 (Ct. App. 1986) ................... 18,19
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550,961 P.2d 641 (1998) .......................................... 9
State v. Estabrook, 842 P.2d 1001 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) ................................ 29

·~·

State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992) .......................................... 7

-.~

State v. Garcia, 126 Idaho 836, 892 P.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1995) ........................ 7, 8
II.··.'

I'

·
I
I

¥
:.:.'

State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62,844 P.2d 691 (1992) ....................................... 34
State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784,932 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1997) ............................. 36
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396,958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998) ......................... 36
State v. Hensley, 145 Idaho 852, 187 P.3d 1227 (2008) .................................... 27

U

II.'

State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139,176 P.3d 911 (2007) ....................................... 22

I

State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 24 P.3d 44 (2001) .................................... 22, 28

I
I
I
I

I
I
I

State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623,873 P.2d 877 (1994) ....................................... 28
State v. Jackson, 140 Idaho 636,97 P.3d 1025 (Ct. App. 2004) ........................ 28
State v. Jennings, 122 Idaho 531,835 P.2d 1342 (Ct. App. 1992) .................... 28
State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008) ..................................... 34
State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho 877,606 P.2d 981 (1980) ......................................... 11
State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349,160 P.3d 1284 (Ct. App. 2007) ......................... 19
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000) ................................. 15, 20
State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,872 P.2d 708 (1994) ..................................... 36

v

State v. McNew, 131 Idaho 268,954 P.2d 686 (Ct. App. 1998} ........................... 7
Statev. Mitchell, 1.04 Idaho 493, 66.0 P.2d 1336 (1983} ..................................... 11
State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887,231 P.3d 532 (Ct. App. 2.o1.o} ..................... 14,18
Statev. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29,921 P.2d 2.06 (Ct. App. 1996} ...... 14, 18
State v. Rogers, 14.0 Idaho 223,91 P.3d 1127 (2.o.o4) ....................................... 1.0
State v. Row, 131 Idaho 3.03,955 P.2d 1.082 (1998) ......................................... 34
State v. Talmage, 1.04 Idaho 249,658 P.2d 92.0 (1983} ............................... 18, 19
Statev. Wavrick, 123 Idaho 83,844 P.2d 712 (Ct. App. 1992} .......................... 13
State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 29 P.3d 949 (2.o.o1) ......................... 13, 14, 15, 2.0
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,923 P.2d 966 (1996) ........................................ 27
State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971,829 P.2d 861 (1992} .......................... 22, 28
Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797,573 P.2d 116 (1977} ...................................... 11
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) ................................................. 11
Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 148 P.3d 1267 (2.o.o6) ...................................... 1.0

STATUTES
I.C. § 9-18.05 ...................................................................................................... 25
I.C. § 9-18.08 ...................................................................................................... 25
I.C. § 18-15.08 .................................................................................................... 33
I.C. § 18-83.04 .................................................................................................... 12
I.C. § 19-35.01 ............................................................................................. passim
I.C. § 19-35.06 .................................................................................................... 1.0

vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jonathan Earl Folk appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd
conduct with a minor child under the age of sixteen years.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Charity Reed had three children, including a son, "TR.," who, at the time
of Folk's crime, was five years old.

(Tr., p.203, Ls.8-24.)

Charity and her

husband (Brian Reed), Charity's grandmother, and Charity's three children, lived
in the grandmother's home. (Tr., p.203, L.20 - p.204, L.10.) During the 2007
Christmas period, Charity's aunt's adult stepson, Blaine Blair, was allowed by the
grandmother to stay at the residence against Charity's wishes. (Tr., p.204, L.14p.205, L.22; p.219, L.7 - p.220, L.7.) Jonathan Folk was a distant relative of
Charity whom she had met once prior to seeing him when he dropped Blair off at
Charity's house a couple days before Christmas. (Tr., p.206, L.20 - p.207, L.4.)
On Christmas day, Charity drove her cousin's children to their mother's
home, and when she returned home Folk was there.

(Tr., p.204, Ls.19-21;

p.205, L.15 - p.206, L.6.) Also present at Charity's home was April Prock and her
two children.

(Tr., p.205, Ls.19-22.)

Charity went into the kitchen for ten to

fifteen minutes to help her grandmother prepare dinner, and when she came out,
she asked her husband where TR. was because dinner was ready. (Tr., p.207,
L.25 - p.209, L.23.) Charity's husband said he thought TR. was in his bedroom
playing, and as Charity walked about the corner through the door to the boys'
room, she heard TR. say, "ew, that's gross." (Tr., p.243, Ls.6-9; p.257, Ls.8-12.)
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Charity saw Folk kneeling down in front of T.R. with T.R.'s legs around him, and
Folk's hands on T.R.'s hips. (Tr., p.209, L.23 - p.210, L.12.)
Charity asked Folk what he was doing, and he told her they were just
playing. (Tr., p.210, Ls.14-15.) T.R. began to laugh and went right to Charity as
Folk backed away.

(Tr., p.210, Ls.15-17.)

Folk stood in the bedroom for a

couple of minutes, then he left after the other children entered the bedroom. (Tr.,
p.210, Ls.20-22.) Charity asked TR., "what were you guys doing in here?" and
T.R. said they were just playing. (Tr., p.210, Ls.23-25.) Charity went to the living
room and after noticing Folk trying to play with the rest of the children and
attempting to pick up her four-year-old son, she told April she had a bad feeling
that something just happened. (Tr., p.211, Ls.5-20.) Right before Blair and Folk
left the house, Folk handed TR. -- but not any of the other children -- some
candy and change out of his pocket. (Tr., p.212, Ls.5-11.) After Blair and Folk
left, TR. "was kind of shying away from everybody," and was clinging to Charity,
which was unusual. (Tr., p.218, Ls.11-24; p.385, Ls.13-17.)
At 8:30 p.m., the children's usual bedtime, TR. did not want to go to his
bed, but instead ended up sleeping with Charity's grandmother. (Tr., p.213, Ls.514.) At about 4:00 the next morning, Charity was awoken by TR., who told her
he had just had a nightmare, and when asked what it was about, he explained he
had a "bad dream about what that guy did to me last night." (Tr., p.213, Ls.1418.) Later that morning Charity called the police. (Tr., p.213, L.23 - p.214, L.19.)
While waiting for the police to arrive, Charity took T.R. aside and asked him what
happened the night before, and he told her "Johnny" (T.R.'s name for Folk) put

2

his mouth on his (T.R.'s) penis. (Tr., p.215, Ls.1-5.) Charity did not know what
to do, so she just hugged T.R. and held him. (Tr., p.215, Ls.5-7.) When T.R.
asked Charity if he was going to be in trouble, she reassured him he would not,
and told him he had done the right thing by telling her about the incident. (Tr.,
p.215, Ls.7-10.) A police officer arrived shortly thereafter. (Tr., p.215, Ls.1B-19.)
According to T.R., when he and Folk went into his bedroom, just before
his mother came into the room, he was laying down on his bed when Folk pulled
his clothes half-way down "just where he could see [his] private," and put his
mouth on T.R.'s private. (Tr., p.320, L.4 - p.322, L.B; p.347,Ls.5-7; p.349, Ls.1023.) T.R. explained:
A.
He took his mouth -- and when he took his mouth off, he
went (sound).

Q.

He went (sound). Is that the sound that he made?

A.

Yeah. He went (sound).

(Tr., p.322, Ls.15-19.) When T.R. tried to yell for his mother, Folk covered his
mouth. 1 (Tr., p.325, Ls.2-5; p.341, Ls.20-24; p.342, Ls.3-B.)
Folk was charged with lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. (R., Vol.
1, pp.56-57.) At the pre-trial conference, Folk asked for permission to represent
himself and was allowed to do so -- with standby counsel appointed to "address
any particular technical or legal issues there might be." (Supp. Tr., p.15, L.19p.16, L.1; p.1B, Ls.20-24; p.22, Ls.19-25.) The court noted that Folk's request
opened up potential issues as to how T.R. could be appropriately cross-

During trial, the state presented testimony by three witnesses that had either
been victims of, or witnesses to, prior bad sex acts committed by Folk upon them
or others as children years earlier. (See generally Tr., pp.402-454.)
1

3

examined by Folk himself. (Supp. Tr., p.16, L.18 - p.17, L.19.) The state filed a
motion requesting cross-examination of TR. be conducted by Folk's standby
counselor, alternatively, without visual contact through audio technology.

(R.,

Vol. 1, pp.116-117.) The trial court granted the state's motion, and permitted
TR. to testify in a separate room through closed circuit video outside the direct
presence of Folk.

(R., Vol. 2, pp.196-204; Tr., p.311, L.12 - p.315, L.2.)

Additionally, the trial court ruled that TR. could only be cross-examined by Folk
submitting written questions to his standby counsel to ask. (R., Vol. 2, pp.196204.)
The jury convicted Folk on the lewd conduct charge (R., Vol. 2, pp.366367), and he was ordered to serve a fixed life sentence (R., Vol. 2, pp.312-313).
Folk timely appealed. (R., Vol. 2, pp.317-320.)
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ISSUES
Folk states the issues on appeal as:
1)

Did the district court err when it violated Mr. Folk's speedy
trial rights?

2)

Did the district court commit reversible error when it deprived
Mr. Folk of his constitutional right to confront his accuser?

3)

Did the district court commit reversible error when it deprived
Mr. Folk his constitutional right to represent himself?

4)

Did the district court deny Mr. Folk's rights to due process of
law, by incorrectly instructing the jury that Mr. Folk could be
guilty of lewd conduct by making any type of sexual advance
when it refused to remove !let cetera" from the clarifying
instruction?

5)

Under the doctrine of cumulative error, was Mr. Folk's right
to a fair trial denied as a result of the accumulation of serious
errors throughout his trial?

(Appellant's Brief, p.1S.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Folk failed to demonstrate any violation of his statutory or
constitutional right to a speedy trial?
2.
Has Folk failed to show that his constitutional right to confront his accuser
was violated?
3.
Has Folk failed to show that his constitutional right to self-representation
was violated?
4.
Has Folk failed to demonstrate the trial court erred by its answer to the
jury's question about Instruction Sixteen?
5.
Has Folk failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine applies to this
case?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Folk Has Failed To Demonstrate Any Violation Of His Statutory Or Constitutional
Rights To A Speedy Trial

A.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Introduction
Folk contends his statutory (I.C. § 19-3501) and state and federal

constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated by the delay of his jury trial to
approximately one year after charges were filed against him in district court.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.19-37.)
Folk's constitution-based speedy trial arguments were not preserved for
appellate review because he failed to present them to the district court as
constitutional claims and the trial court did not rule on such claims. Folk's claim
that his statutory speedy trial right was violated should be rejected because: (1)
the issue is moot because the only remedy possible was dismissal without
prejudice and a fair trial -- the latter of which Folk has already received; (2) Folk
requested one continuance of his trial date within the six-month speedy trial
period, therefore his statutory speedy trial right was no longer in effect; and (3)
there was "good cause" to continue Folk's trial date beyond the statutory sixmonth period.

B.

Standard Of Review
The issue of speedy trial rights is a mixed question of fact and law.

Deference is given to factual determinations which are supported by substantial
evidence, with the appellate court exercising free review over application of the

6

law to the facts found by the trial court. State v. McNew, 131 Idaho 268, 269,
954 P.2d 686, 687 (Ct. App. 1998).

C.

Folk Has Failed To Preserve The Argument That His State And Federal
Constitutional Rights To A Speedy Trial Were Violated
Folk asks this Court to vacate his conviction and dismiss his case with

prejudice, arguing that he was deprived of his state and federal constitutional
rights to a speedy trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-37.) This Court must decline to
consider the merits of Folk's claim, however, because it was not preserved for
appellate review.
It is well settled that issues not raised below will generally not be
considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 888-89,

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
til.··

fJ

136 P.3d 350, 359-60 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195,824
P.2d 123, 126 (1992). It is equally well settled "that in order for an issue to be
raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis
for an assignment of error." State v. Amerson, 129 Idaho 395, 401, 925 P.2d
399, 405 (Ct. App. 1996).

A claim of a speedy trial violation presents a

particularly fact intensive inquiry. State v. Garcia, 126 Idaho 836, 838, 892 P.2d
903, 905 (Ct. App. 1995). For this reason, a speedy trial issue that is not argued
to or considered by the court below will not be considered on appeal.

kL;

Averett, 142 Idaho at 889, 136 P.3d at 360; Amerson, 129 Idaho at 401, 925
P.2d at 405. As explained by the Court of Appeals in Garcia:
[A]n alleged violation of speedy trial rights is particularly
inappropriate for consideration for the first time on appeal because
the appellate record, where no speedy trial challenge was raised
below, is seldom adequate to permit resolution of the claim. Such a

I
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claim raises mixed questions of fact and law, and determining
whether the right to a speedy trial has been infringed requires
application of the balancing test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-92, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).
This balancing test involves consideration of the length of the delay
of the trial, the reason for the delay, the defendant's diligence in
asserting his right, and prejudice to the defendant. The factors to
be considered in this balancing process often present factual
issues, particularly with respect to the reasons for the delay and
whether the defendant has suffered prejudice. If a motion for relief
based on speedy trial rights was not asserted before the trial court,
the State has received no opportunity to present evidence or
otherwise make a record addressing those issues, and the trial
court has not resolved factual issues in conducting the balancing
test. Therefore, when the defendant asserts a speedy trial violation
for the first time on appeal, the appellate court generally has neither
factual findings of the trial court to review nor an adequate record
upon which the appellate court could determine whether the Barker
v. Wingo factors weigh in favor of the defendant or the state.
Garcia, 126 Idaho at 838, 892 P .2d at 905 (internal citations omitted). See a/so

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Averett, 142 Idaho at 889,136 P.3d at 360.
In this case, Folk failed to file a motion to dismiss based upon an alleged
violation of his constitutional speedy trial rights, and never mentioned them to the
district court. Folk made no mention of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),
and he did not otherwise present argument on or ask the district court to consider
the Barker v. Wingo factors to determine whether they weighed in favor of or
against a finding of a constitutional speedy trial violation. Having failed to do so,
Folk not only deprived the district court of the opportunity to make factual findings
or rule upon such issues as the reasons for any pre-trial delay or whether Folk
was prejudiced by such delay, he also deprived the state of its opportunity to
make a record on these issues.

8
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Folk seems to concede he did not object to any trial delays based on his
constitutional rights to a speedy trial. (See Appellant's Brief, p.31.) Instead, he
argues that although most issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,
"[a]n exception to this rule, however, has been applied by this Court when the
issue was argued to or decided by the trial court." (Id., (emphasis in Appellant's
Brief), quoting State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998).)
Folk implies that the trial court's findings of "good cause" to continue the trial
settings (see Tr., p.70, Ls.2-3; p.79, L.3) were rulings on his constitutional rights
to a speedy trial. However, "good cause" is an obvious reference to the finding
required to show compliance with the statutory speedy trial right under I.C. § 193501. The trial court did not mention, much less rule upon, Folk's constitutional
speedy trial rights. Folk cannot rightfully contend, as he does, that he is entitled
to present his constitution-based speedy trial issues on appeal because they
were "decided by the trial court." (See Appellant's Brief, p.31; quoting DuValt,
131 Idaho at 553,961 P.2d at 644.)
Because Folk failed to present his speedy trial issues as constitutional
issues below, and because the trial court did not make an adverse ruling in
regard to such rights, Folk's constitutional speedy trial issues cannot be
considered on appeal.

9

D.

I
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Folk Has Failed To Show His Statutory Speedy Trial Right Was Violated
1.

Folk's Claim That The District Court Violated His Statutory Speedy
Trial Right Is Moot

Folk argues that the district court violated his statutory right to a speedy
trial under I.C. § 19-3501. This claim is moot because, even assuming there
might be merit to the claim, no relief can be granted.
The mootness doctrine precludes review when '''the issues presented are
no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.'"
Idaho Schools For Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. Of Educ., 128 Idaho 276,
281, 912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432,
816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991)). "An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real
and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief."
State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 232 P.3d 327, 2010 WL 1632625 *2 (2010)
(citations omitted).

Mootness also applies when a favorable judicial decision

would not result in any relief.

Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 524, 148 P.3d

1267, 1270 (2006) (citing State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 1127,
1131 (2004)).
Where, as here, a defendant is facing felony charges, the remedy for a
statutory speedy trial violation is dismissal without prejudice.

See I.C. §§ 19-

3501, 19-3506. Thus, even had the trial court dismissed the case on the basis of
a statutory speedy trial violation, the state could have simply re-filed the charges
and proceeded to trial against Folk in a new criminal action. As explained in
State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 842, 118 P.3d 160, 175 (Ct. App. 2005)
(emphasis added):
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· .. [A] violation of Section 19-3501 does not necessarily implicate
the constitutional right to a speedy trial. ...
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Further, Davis's contention that allowing the state to refile a
charge alleging the same offense as the dismissed charge violated
her right to due process is without support in the record. Statutes
of limitation, which provide predictable, legislatively-enacted limits
on prosecutorial delay, provide the primary guarantee against
bringing overly stale criminal charges. United States v. Lovasco,
431 U.S. 783, 789, ... (1977). Nonetheless, statutes of limitation
do not fully define a defendant's right with respect to the events
occurring prior to filing criminal charges. Id. The Due Process
Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive
delay. Id. The filing of a subsequent criminal action following
dismissal of the original criminal action after preliminary
proceedings is not a per se violation of due process. Stockwell v.
State, 98 Idaho 797, 805, 573 P.2d 116, 124 (1977). However, the
dismissal and refiling of criminal complaints by the prosecutor,
when done for the purpose of harassment, delay, or forumshopping, can violate a defendant's right to due process. State v.
Bacon, 117 Idaho 679, 683, 791 P.2d 429, 433 (1990); Stockwell,
98 Idaho at 806, 573 P.2d at 125. Before a due process violation
can be found, the defendant must show that the preaccusation
delay caused substantial prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair
trial and that the delay was a deliberate device to gain an
advantage over the accused. State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho 877, 879,
606 P.2d 981, 983 (1980); State v. Burchard, 123 Idaho 382, 386,
848 P.2d 440, 444 (Ct. App. 1993).
The state relies upon the argument contained in section D (3), infra, to
show that the trial court's resetting of Folk's trial date six weeks beyond the
statutory speedy trial deadline did not adversely affect Folk's due process rights
to a fair trial. 2 Errors that do not affect the fairness of the trial, where one is had,
are generally not reviewable on appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493,
500, 660 P.2d 1336, 1343 (1983) (claim of error in preliminary hearing is not

The relevant time frame for considering whether Folk's statutory speedy trial
right was violated is based on the trial court's resetting of Folk's jury trial six
weeks beyond the July 28, 2008, speedy trial deadline -- to September 8, 2008.
See Issue I, § D(2)(b), infra.
2
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ground to vacate conviction after fair trial); Loomis v. Killeen 135 Idaho 607,613,
21 P.3d 929, 935 (Ct. App. 2001) (claim of errors in preliminary parole hearing
not reviewed where there was fair parole violation hearing). Because Folk has
failed to show that the alleged violation of I.C. 19-3501 of having his trial set six
weeks beyond the six-month statutory speedy trial deadline affected the fairness
of his criminal proceeding or trial, his claim of error is moot.

2.

Folk's Request For A Continuance Within The Six-Month Statutory
Period Made His Statutory Speedy Trial Right Inapplicable

Folk was charged with lewd conduct, and for being a persistent violator, in
an Information filed January 28, 2008 with the district court.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

20.)

3

(R., Vol. 1, pp.19-

Folk contends that the case against him should have been dismissed

because he was not brought to trial within six months of the filing of the
information, in violation of Idaho Code § 19-3501. (Appellant's Brief, pp.36-37.)
However, the record makes clear there was no violation of the speedy trial
proviSions of that statute.

Because the trial had been delayed on at least one

occasion at Folk's request or consent, the speedy trial statute was not applicable.
Idaho Code § 19-3501 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following
cases:

2. If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed
upon his application, is not brought to trial within six

The Information was later amended to charge lewd conduct with notice that,
upon conviction, the state would seek to have Folk sentenced as a repeat sex
offender and fall under the sex offender registration requirements of I.C. § 188304. (R., Vol. 1, pp.56-57.)
3
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71:

(6) months from the date that the indictment or
information is filed with the court.
(Emphasis added.)
The plain language of the statute states that the six-month limitation
applies only to a defendant "whose trial has not been postponed upon his
application." Id.; but see State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116 n.2, 29 P.3d 949,
952 n.2 (2001) (not ruling on "whether the protection granted ... is waived ...
only when such postponement caused the trial to be rescheduled beyond the sixmonth period"). In this case, Folk moved for a two-week continuance of the May

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

27, 2008 trial date in order to prepare for a motions hearing (Supp. Tr., p.31,
Ls.2-3), and when advised that the new trial date would be June 23, 2008, Folk
replied, "That's fine" (Supp. Tr., p.32, Ls.17-25).

Therefore, the record

establishes that Folk's own motion resulted in an almost one-month delay in his
trial, a fact that alone is sufficient to take this case outside the provisions of Idaho
Code § 19-3501.
In State v. Wavrick, 123 Idaho 83,88,844 P.2d 712,717 (Ct. App. 1992),
the court addressed Wavrick's assertion that "his agreement to postpone the
original trial date did not constitute a waiver of his speedy trial right under the
statute because . . . he stated that postponement of the original trial date
constituted only a limited waiver of his statutory speedy trial right." The court
held:
...
and
The
trial

I.C. § 19-3501 does not allow defendants to postpone their trial
at the same time maintain their statutory speedy trial rights.
language of I.C. § 19-3501 is clear in providing that once the
is postponed upon the application of the defendant, the
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defendant has waived the six-month time limit for speedy trial
required by the statute.

&

In this case, once Folk agreed to postpone his trial date from May 2yth to

June 23 rd , he waived the six-month time limit set by I.C. § 19-3501 to bring his
case to trial. He is thus precluded from asserting on appeal that his statutory
right to proceed to trial within six months was violated.

3.

The District Court Correctly Determined There Was Good Cause
To Continue Folk's Trial Beyond Six Months
a.

Law Relevant To Statutory "Good Cause"

In State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532, 544 (Ct. App. 2010), the
Idaho Court of Appeals explained the relevant law to determine whether a
defendant's statutory speedy trial right has been violated:
When a defendant who invokes his statutory speedy trial rights is
not brought to trial within six months and shows that trial was not
postponed at his request, the burden then shifts to the state to
demonstrate good cause for the court to decline to dismiss an
action. State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 38, 921 P.2d 206,
215 (Ct. App. 1996). "Good cause" means that there was a
substantial reason for the delay that rises to the level of a legal
excuse. State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116, 29 P .3d 949, 952
(2001); [State v.] Clark, 135 Idaho [255] at 260, 16 P.3d [931] at
936 [2000]. Analysis of whether there was good cause for a
statutory speedy trial violation is not simply a determination of who
was responsible for the delay and how long the case has been
pending. Young, 136 Idaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952. Rather, the
analysis should focus upon the reason for the delay. Id. But the
reason for the delay cannot be evaluated entirely in a vacuum and
a good cause determination may take into account the additional
factors listed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 ... (1972).
See Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936. Thus, insofar as they
bear on the sufficiency or strength of the reason for the delay, a
court may consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) whether the
defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and (3) the prejudice
to the defendant. However, the reason for the delay lies at the heart
of a good cause determination under I.C. § 19-3501. Id.
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The ultimate question of whether legal excuse has been
shown is a matter for judicial determination upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. A trial judge does not have unbridled
discretion to find good cause, however, and on appeal we will
independently review the lower court's exercise of discretion. Id.
We first examine the reason for the delay and then address the
remaining Barker v. Wingo factors as they apply in this case.

I
I

I
I
I
I

cause" statutory inquiry -- while the remaining three Barker v. Wingo factors may

8
Ii

Folk had the right, under I.C. § 19-3501 (2), to be brought to trial within six

Following the pattern set out in Moore, the reason for the continuance of
Folk's trial beyond the six-month statutory period is the main focus of the "good

be considered in determining the strength of that reason.

b.

The Trial Court Had Good Cause To Continue Folk's Trial

months of the filing of the Information. Since the Information in his case was filed

I
I
I

only continuance relevant in determining whether there was "good cause" to

I

Idaho 831, 833, 11 P.3d 27, 29 (2000) ("Once the trial has been postponed, the

I
I
I
I
I
I

January 28, 2008, the state had until July 28, 2008, to bring Folk to trial. 4 The

continue Folk's trial is the court's July 2, 2008 order which reset the trial beyond
the statutory six-month period for the first time.

See State v. Lundquist, 134

six-month statutory period no longer applies."); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113,
116 n.2, 29 P.3d 949, 952 n.2 (2001) ("In Lundquist, however, the defendant's
requested postponement caused the trial to be rescheduled beyond the sixmonth period.")

The trial court appears to have accepted the prosecutor's determination that
Folk's speedy trial deadline was July 25,2008. (Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.12, L.4.)

4
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Here, the delay beyond the statutory six-month period from the filing of the
Information was caused, in large part, by Folk's belated decision to represent
himself against his lewd conduct charge.

On May 14, 2008, about three and

one-half months into his six-month statutory speedy trial period, Folk advised the

I
I

I
I
I

I
I
I

court he wanted to represent himself, and his motion was granted. (Supp. Tr.,
p.15, L.19 - p.16, L.1; p.22, Ls.23-25.)

The court noted that Folk's request

opened up potential issues as to how the five-year-old victim could be
appropriately cross-examined by Folk, and the prosecutor shared that concern.

5

(Supp. Tr., p.16, L.18 - p.17, L.19.)
Following the July 2, 2008, motions hearing, which included consideration
of the state's motion to preclude Folk from personally cross-examining the victim,
the trial court ordered a continuance because it needed time to render decisions
on the motions raised. The court explained that a continuance was necessary
due to the complexities of the issues, Folk's recent decision to represent himself,
and Folk's insistence upon personally cross-examining the victim; the court
stated:

I

It's going to take me some time to review these issues. There's a
lot of material that has been submitted. And these are really, at
least in terms of this issue of the cross-examination and its
implications to the trial and how the child is presented, there's not a
lot of case law in Idaho, and it's kind of a first impression thing, and
I want to make sure that I've got at least as close as I can get it to
being right, which is going to take some time, which means our trial
date as set now is going to have to be bumped.

I
I

I
I

I
I

On June 10, 2008, the state filed a motion entitled, "Motion to Prohibit the
Defendant from Personally Cross Examining the Young Child Victim," proposing
cross-examination of the victim be by Folk's standby counsel, or alternatively,
without visual contact through audio technology. (R., Vol. 1, pp.116-117.)
5
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I'm looking at -- and I know this is not anybody's fault; it's
just the way this case has developed. We have been taking
movement [sic] on this case in terms of all of these things for
several months now. And Mr. Folk is proceeding now on his own
behalf, and that's -- and that has made things a little more
complicated in terms of the technicalities of the trial, so we're going
to have to move the trial.
(Tr., p.67, LsA-23 (emphasis added).) The trial court asked Folk about setting
his trial date on September 8, 2008 (Tr., p.69, Ls.2-3), putting his trial beyond the
six-month period for the first time. Folk said he just had one question: "Does
that affect my right to a speedy trial?" (Tr., p.69, LsA-6.) The court replied:

I
I
I
I

I
I

I
I

Well, your right to a speedy trial is to be tried within six
months of the Information, unless there's good cause otherwise. I
am finding that because of the intricacies of this defense and the
process of trying to work through the prosecution and the defense,
it's really important for us to do this right, in order to afford you an
opportunity to present a defense. I can't do it any other way. I've
got to have some time here.
(Tr., p.69, Ls.7-15.)
Folk then asked, "And this is two months?" (Tr., p.69, L.16.) The district
court reiterated:
Well, it's the first time I can get to it. I mean, I don't have any
time in August now. My August is just crammed, and I'm putting it
as -- I'm going to put it on first. I can't -- well, let me put it this way.
Once this is under advisement, I've got to have time to write an
opinion. I'm not going to get the opinions out before the first of
August. I will hope to have them shortly after the first of August,
which gives you time to get the opinions and deal with them. And
we will have trial on September 8th . I'm finding that there is good
cause for the speedy trial issue.
(Tr., p.69, L.17 - p.70, L.3.) Folk said, "All right. Thank you." (Tr., p.70, LA.)

I

I
I
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The trial court had good cause to set Folk's trial beyond the statutory sixmonth speedy trial date. 6 The reason for the delay -- the trial court's need to
prepare its decisions after the July 2 motions hearing in regard to how the victim
would testify at trial -- was largely the result of Folk's late decision to represent
himself and question the victim. See State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29,
37, 921 P.2d 206, 214 (Ct. App. 1996) (actions of the defendant in filing a late
suppression motion, the prosecutor, and the trial court's crowded calendar, all
contributed to the delay). In addition to the trial court's valid reasoning for the
continuance, a review of Folk's case in light of the three remaining Barker v.
Wingo factors, as suggested in Moore, greatly favors a finding that Folk's

I
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I
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D

statutory speedy trial right was not violated.

See Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231

P.3d at 544.
First, the date Folk's trial was continued to -- September 8th

--

was six

weeks beyond his speedy trial deadline (July 28 th ). See fn.3, supra. Six weeks
is not a significant amount of time to continue a trial involving the serious charge
Folk was facing, and for the reason stated by the trial court -- to prepare legal
decisions on how the victim should testify in a lewd conduct case being defended
by Folk pro se. As noted in Barker, the reasonableness of length of the delay
must be evaluated in light of the nature of the offense for which the defendant is
standing trial: "[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is

Folk may have acquiesced in continuing his trial beyond the six-month speedy
trial date. See State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 845, 718 P.2d 1272, 1283 (Ct.
App. 1986) (defendant's assertion of speedy trial right is significant to show that
he has not acquiesced in delay.); State v. Talmage, 104 Idaho 249, 253, 658
P.2d 920,924 (1983) (delays caused or consented to by the defendant constitute
waiver of statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights).
6
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considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge." Barker, 407
U.S. 531. Considering the nature of the charge on which Folk was standing trial
- lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen -- the length of the delay was not
substantial and does not weigh in Folk's favor.
In regard to the next Barker factor, the dialogue between Folk and the trial
court at the conclusion of the July 2, 2008 motions hearing shows that Folk did
not assert his right to a speedy trial. Folk merely asked the court if the proffered
continuance would "affect" his right to a speedy trial, and after the court
explained the reasons for finding good cause to continue the trial date, Folk
replied, "All right. Thank you." (Tr., p.69, LsA-6; p.70, LA.) In the context of the
constitutional speedy trial right, a defendant's assertion of his right is "entitled to

R
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strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived
of the right." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828,839,118
P.3d 160, 171 (Ct. App. 2005). However, "failure to assert the right will make it
difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial."

Here,

Folk's failure to assert his speedy trial right weighs in favor of a finding that his
statutory speedy trial right was not violated. See State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834,
845, 718 P.2d 1272, 1283 (Ct. App. 1986) (defendant's assertion of speedy trial
right is significant to show that he has not acquiesced in delay.); State v.
Talmage, 104 Idaho 249, 253, 658 P.2d 920, 924 (1983) (delays caused or
consented to by the defendant constitute waiver of statutory and constitutional
speedy trial rights); see also State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349,353,160 P.3d 1284,

I
~
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1288 (Ct. App. 2007) (lateness of Lopez's assertion of his speedy trial right
weighs heavily against his contention that the right was violated).
Applying the last Barker factor, Folk has failed to demonstrate -- nor likely
could he -- that the continuance of his trial to a date a mere six weeks beyond the
statutory speedy trial deadline caused him prejudice. His arguments on appeal
(see Appellant's Brief, pp.33-35) -- based wholly on his trial being held in

January, 2009 after subsequent continuances -- are irrelevant in determining
whether the one continuance that placed his trial beyond the statutory speedy
trial deadline (July 28th ) to September 8, 2008, caused him prejudice.

See

Lundquist, 134 Idaho at 833, 11 P.3d at 29; Young, 136 Idaho at 116 n.2, 29
P.3d at 952 n.2.

Folk claims he was prejudiced by having to go to trial in

January, 2009, because by that time, T.R.'s memory had faded, and the state
had time to get their 404(b) witnesses from out of state to testify at trial.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.33-35.) Neither allegation is remotely relevant in showing
whether Folk's due process rights were prejudiced by the continuance of his trial
date to September 8, 2008.
In light of the valid reasons for the trial court's July 2, 2008, continuance of
Folk's trial to a date six weeks beyond the statutory six-month speedy trial period,
and in consideration of the length of the delay, Folk's failure to assert his speedy
trial right when the continuance was being considered, and the lack of any
possible prejudice to such continuance, Folk has failed to show any violation of
his speedy trial right under I.C. § 19-3501.
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II.
Folk Has Failed To Show That His Constitutional Right To Confront His Accuser
Was Violated
A.

..

I
I
I
I
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Introduction
On appeal, Folk contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment

right to confront his victim, T.R., by: (1) permitting T.R.'s testimony to be done
outside Folk's presence through closed circuit video; (2) ruling Folk could only
cross-examine T.R. by submitting written questions for his standby counsel to
ask; (3) modifying the permissible method of impeaching T.R. with his preliminary
hearing testimony; and (4) limiting the duration of T.R.'s cross-examination.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.37-56.)
Because Folk agreed that T.R.'s testimony could be presented outside his
presence, any claim that the trial court erred in allowing T.R. to testify remotely
was waived under the invited error doctrine. Even if considered, the trial court
properly found that forcing 1.R. to testify in Folk's presence would cause 1.R. to
suffer serious emotional trauma and adversely impact his ability to communicate.
Folk's assertions that his right to confrontation was violated by the trial court's
order that he cross-examine 1. R. by submitting written questions to his standby
counsel, changing the way Folk could impeach T.R. with the preliminary hearing
transcript, and prompting Folk to get through his cross-examination of 1.R., are
not supported by any authority and are waived.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse

witnesses was violated is a question of law over which appellate courts exercise
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free review. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 142, 176 P.3d 911, 914 (2007).
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its
judgment will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of that discretion.
State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 731-32, 24 P.3d 44, 48-49 (2001); State v.
Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971,974,829 P.2d 861 (1992).

C.

Any Assertion That Folk's Confrontation Rights Were Violated Because
T.R's Testimony Was Presented Outside Folk's Presence Is Waived
Under The Invited Error Doctrine
During the July 2, 2008 motions hearing, Folk agreed that TR's testimony

could be conducted outside his presence. He stated:
The defense does not object to the identity of the defendant
being concealed from the witness.
To ease the witness's
testimony, they can either alter my voice and [sic] not show myself
to the witness.
(Tr., p.63, Ls.9-12.)
The doctrine of invited error estops a party from asserting an error when
his own conduct induced the commission of the error.

State v. Atkinson, 124

Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). Similarly, a party may not
complain of errors he has consented to or acquiesced in. State v. Caudhill, 109
Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985). Under the doctrine of invited error,
Folk is precluded from claiming that the district court improperly ordered TR's
testimony to be presented outside Folk's immediate presence.

As Folk's

appellate counsel seems to acknowledge, Folk waived his right to challenge on
appeal the trial court's determination that TR.'s testimony would be done outside
Folk's presence through closed circuit video.
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(See Appellant's Brief, p.41

I
I
I
I
I
I

("Whether or not Craig7 is still valid law was not technically preserved in the
instant case because Mr. Folk may have conceded the issue"; p.58 ("Mr. Folk did
not object to having the child concealed from him to eliminate any possible
concern the State may have with his interaction with the child.").) Inasmuch as
Folk agreed that T.R.'s testimony could be done outside his presence, Folk
cannot complain that the trial court erred in permitting T.R. to testify that way.

D.

Folk Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred In Determining T.R. Could
Testify Outside. Folk's Presence Because He Would Suffer Serious
Emotional Trauma And Adversely Impact His Ability To Communicate
After a motions hearing, the trial court issued a written opinion on whether

~

T.R. should testify outside the presence of Folk and whether Folk would be

....

i!

allowed to personally ask questions during T.R.'s cross-examination. (R., Vol. 2,
pp.196-205.) Although, as discussed, Folk agreed to not be personally present
during T.R.'s testimony (see Tr., p.63, Ls.9-12), the district court's written opinion

I

iii.'.
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covered the "presence" issue just as if Folk had objected. The relevant portions
of the court's decision, although lengthy, reflect that the court reasonably applied
the operative law to the relevant facts in ruling T.R. could testify by closed circuit
video outside Folk's presence. The court explained:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to
"be confronted with the witnesses against him." The Supreme
Court has said that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees the
defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before
the trier of fact." [Citations omitted.]

See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990) (child sexual abuse victims
permitted to testify against alleged abuser out of his presence and outside of the
courtroom by closed circuit television).

7
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The [C]ourt has "never held, however, that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a faceto-face meeting with witnesses against them at triaL" Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990). The preference for face to face
confrontation "must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case." Craig, 497 U.S. at
849 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
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When analyzing whether the preference for face to face
consideration must give way, courts must determine whether using
some procedure other than direct cross examination "is necessary
to further an important state interest." Craig[,~97 U.S. at 852.

The Craig court found that "a State's interest in the physical
and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be
sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a
defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court." Id. at 853.
The Craig court went on to determine that "if the State makes an
adequate showing of necessity, the state interest in protecting child
witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is
sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that
permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a
defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the
defendant." Id. at 855.
Essential to the finding in Craig was that the trial court made
a "case-specific finding of necessity." Id. at 860. Courts must
determine that any trauma to the child is brought on by testifying in
the presence of the defendant, not merely by testifying in the
courtroom. Id. at 856. Craig requires trial courts to "hear evidence
and determine whether use of [alternate procedures] is necessary
to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to
testify."
In this case, the court has heard sufficient testimony to
determine that forcing TR. to be cross examined in the presence of
Defendant would cause 1. R. to suffer serious emotional trauma that
would substantially impair TR.'s ability to communicate.
Specifically Ms. Reed has testified that 1. R. has suffered from
nightmares about Defendant,[8] and TR. himself has testified that

8 The state has filed a motion to augment the record on appeal with the
preliminary hearing transcript in Folk's case, which will be referred to as "Prelim.
Tr." Charity Reed, TR.'s mother, testified during that hearing that TR. woke up
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Defendant told T.R not to tell anyone about the incident.[9] Given
these factors along with T.R's young age, the court concludes that
there is clear and convincing evidence to support takin~ T.R's
testimony by alternate means consistent with I.C. § 9-1805.[ 0]

I

Allowing T.R to present his testimony through closed circuit
television satisfies the requirements of the confrontation clause.
Defendant's standby counsel will have the opportunity to cross
examine T.R in view of the jury. The procedure preserves
Defendant's right of confrontation, in satisfaction of the
requirements of the Crawford [v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)]
and Craig cases.
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(R, Vol. 2, pp.198-200.)
Folk has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in finding T.R
would suffer serious emotional trauma and substantially impair his ability to
communicate.

In addition to the factors noted by the court -- T.R's age, T.R

suffered nightmares about the incident, and Folk warned T. R not to tell anyone,

at 4:00 the morning after the incident, and said "he had a nightmare about what
the guy did to him last night." (Prelim. Tr., p.5, L.23 - p.6, L.12; p.13, Ls.2-4.)
9 T.R. testified at the preliminary hearing that Folk covered his mouth after the
incident because he didn't want anyone to know "that he did it." (Prelim. Tr.,
p.40, Ls.6-11; see id., p.38, Ls.1-20.) The record before the trial court included
two state memoranda indicating Folk told T.R not to tell the police. (R, Vol. 1,
p.73 (in interview, T.R said "Folk told him not to tell the police."); p.129 (same).)
10

I.C. § 9-1808, reads in relevant part:
(1) In a criminal proceeding, the presiding officer may order the
presentation of the testimony of a child witness by an alternative
method only in the following situations:

(b) A child witness' testimony may be taken other than in a
face-to-face confrontation between the child and a defendant if the
presiding officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
child would suffer serious emotional trauma that would substantially
impair the child's ability to communicate with the finder of fact
required to be confronted face-to-face by the defendant.
25

I
the court was also aware that the nature of the allegation against Folk concerned
a very personally embarrassing subject -- that Folk had oral-to-genital contact
with T.R. (See R., Vol. 1, p.19.) Based on those factors, the trial court properly
concluded that if TR. were forced to testify in Folk's direct presence, TR. would
"suffer serious emotional trauma that would substantially impair [his] ability to
communicate," permitting TR. to testify outside Folk's presence.

(R., Vol. 2,

p.200.)

E.

Folk's Arguments That The Trial Court Violated His Sixth Amendment
Right To Confrontation By Limiting The Manner And Duration Of His
Cross-Examination Of TR. Are Not Supported With Authority And Should
Not Be Considered On Appeal
Folk also asserts the trial court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to
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I

confrontation by (a) ruling Folk could only cross-examine TR. by submitting
written questions for his standby counsel to ask, (b) modifying the permissible
method of impeaching 1. R. by allowing relevant portions of his preliminary
hearing transcript to be read into the record by the judge's law clerk (see Tr.,
p.335, Ls.15-20),11 and (c) limiting the duration of TR.'s cross-examination by
prodding

Folk to complete

it before TR.'s attention was exhausted. 12

(Appellant's Brief, pp.51-56.) The only authority Folk provides in regard to these

Folk claims the trial court originally instructed him "that a reader would be
made available to TR. to attempt to impeach [TR.'s] testimony," but changed the
rules in the middle of trial to allow "the prior testimony to be read into the record."
(Appellant's Brief, p.53.) The state is unclear as to what difference Folk discerns
between the trial court's two statements.
11

12 The trial court told Folk that TR.'s "attention span has about had it, and we're
going to get this done." (Tr., p.334, L.25 - p.335, L.1.) TR. fell asleep later
during cross-examination. (Tr., p.348, Ls.2-4.)
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issues is the general acknowledgement that a district court "has broad discretion
to limit cross-examination to prevent harassment, prejudice, confusion of the
issues or if the testimony is only marginally relevant." (Appellant's Brief, pp.5156; and p.52 (quoting State v. Hensley, 145 Idaho 852,187 P.3d 1227 (2008).)
In State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996), the Idaho
Supreme Court held:
When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law,
authority, or argument, they will not be considered.
Earlier
formulations of this rule stated that an issue was waived if it was
not supported with argument and authority. A party waives an
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not
just if both are lacking. Zichko supported this assignment of error
with argument but no authority. Consequently, he waived this issue
on appeal.

IT;
fiB.'.".·.-.:
. •·•

Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970 (citations omitted); see I.A.R. 35.
Pursuant to Zichko, because Folk has failed to present authority in support of the
three above-described issues he purports to raise on appeal, this Court should
not consider them.

I
I
I
I
I
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III.
Folk Has Failed To Show That His Constitutional Right To Self-Representation
Was Violated
A.

Introd uction
Folk argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to

represent himself at trial by ruling Folk could only cross-examine T.R. by
submitting written questions for his standby counsel to ask. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.56-70.)

However, the trial court properly found that having Folk provide
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written questions for standby counsel to ask during T.R.'s cross-examination did
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not violate Folk's right to represent himself.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will defer to findings of fact supported by substantial

evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional requirements to the
facts found. State v. Jennings, 122 Idaho 531, 533, 835 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Ct.
App. 1992); see, e.g., State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 626, 873 P.2d 877, 880
(1994); State v. Jackson, 140 Idaho 636,639-41,97 P.3d 1025, 1028-30 (Ct.
App. 2004) (citing cases). The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of
evidence, and its judgment will be reversed only when there has been an abuse
of that discretion. Howard, 135 Idaho at 731-32,24 P.3d at 48-49; Zimmerman,
121 Idaho at 974,829 P.2d 861.

C.

Folk Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred By Ruling That His
Standby Counsel Would Personally Cross-Examine T.R. By Asking
Questions Prepared By Folk
After hearing argument on the state's motion to preclude Folk from

personally cross-examining T.R. (Tr., p.61, L.14 - p.64 , L.11), the district court
issued a written opinion granting the state's motion and requiring T.R.'s crossexamination be done by Folk's standby counsel reading questions prepared by
Folk (R., Vol. 2, pp.203-204.)

The trial court reviewed and applied the

appropriate law to the facts in Folk's case as follows:
In addition to the right of confrontation, the Sixth Amendment
also grants defendants an implied right to represent themselves at
trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975). This right is
not absolute, and the Supreme Court has developed a two part test
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to determine if unsolicited participation by counsel violates a
defendants [sic] right of self representation: "First, the pro se
defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he
chooses to present to the jury ... Second, participation by standby
counsel without the defendant's consent should not be allowed to
destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing
himself." McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
The United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and the Idaho Supreme Court appear not to have
considered limitations on a pro se defendant's right to personally
cross examine a child victim in a sexual abuse case.
Other jurisdictions have applied the Faretta, Craig, and
McCaskle [sic] cases to similar situations as the one now before
this court. In State v. Estabrook, 842 P.2d 1001 (Wash.CLApp.
1993), a Washington state appellate court examined whether
preventing a defendant in a sex abuse case from directly cross
examining the developmentally delayed child victim violated the
rights outlined in Faretta and McKaskle. In the Estabrook trial:
[T]he trial court directed Estabrook to submit
his cross examination questions in writing to the court.
The judge then asked those questions after advising
the jury that:
At this time, as I have told you, Mr.
Estabrook has the right of crossexamination. But because of the fact
that he is not represented by an
attorney, I am going to be asking the
questions that he has asked me to ask.
... They are Mr. Estabrook's questions.
During trial, the court gave Estabrook additional time
after J.H.'s direct testimony to prepare his questions.
In addition, the trial court allowed "Mr. Estabrook to
ask all the questions he needs to ask," and refused to
sustain any scope objections to Estabrook's proposed
questions.
Estabrook, 842 P.2d at 1004.
The appellate court found that this procedure satisfied the
two part test in McKaskle by allowing the defendant to maintain
actual control over the case and by not destroying the jury's
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perception that the defendant was representing himself.
1006.

Id. at

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Fields v. Murray, 49
F.3d 1024 (4th Cir. 1995), also considered a Virginia case where a
defendant was not allowed to personally cross examine the child
victims in a sex abuse case. The defendant in Fields was
represented by counsel throughout trial but requested that he be
allowed to personally cross examine the victims. Though the court
determined that the defendant had not invoked his right to self
representation, it nonetheless examined whether the trial court's
refusal to allow the defendant to cross examine the victims violated
the right of self representation. Fields[,] 49 F.3d at 1034.
The Fourth Circuit held that the trial court's refusal complied
with the two part test in McKaskle and the standards set forth in
Craig. Id. at 1036. Additionally, the court held that "The State's
interest here in protecting child sexual abuse victims from the
emotional trauma of being cross-examined by their alleged abuser
is a least as great as, and likely greater than, the State's interest in
Craig of protecting children from the emotional harm of merely
having to testify in their alleged abuser's presence." Id.

I
I
I
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(R., Vol. 2, pp.200-202.)

The trial court concluded that, as expressed in

Estabrook, giving Folk the opportunity to write questions for cross-examination
satisfies the first prong of the McKaskle test -- allowing the defendant to keep
control over the case presented to the jury. (Id., p.202; see McKaskle, 465 U.S.
at 178; Estabrook, 842 P.2d at 1006.) Apart from being able to personally ask
the questions during the cross-examination of T.R., Folk had control over every
other aspect of his trial -- meeting the first prong of the McKaskle test.
The trial court next evaluated the complaint by Folk's standby counsel that
having him read questions prepared by Folk would make it appear that counsel
was representing Folk, in violation of the second prong of the McKaskle test. (R.,
Vol. 2, pp.203-204.)

The trial court was not swayed by that argument, and

~
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instead followed the reasoning in Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir. 1995),13
explaining:
The Fields court found that "Denying personal crossexamination may have inhibited Fields' dignity and autonomy to
some degree by affecting 'the jury's perception that [he was]
representing himself,' but, as he would have conducted every other
portion of the trial, his dignity and autonomy would have been
'otherwise assured.'" Fields[,J at 1035 (quoting McCaskle [sic], 465
U.S. at 174). The court found that denying the defendant the right
to directly cross examine the victim did not violate the Craig and
McKaskle requirements because it was clear to the jury from the
rest of the trial that the defendant was representing himself Here,
the court antiCipates that Defendant will be conducting the entirety
of his defense. Informing the jury that Defendant prepared the
questions and having standby counsel conduct the cross
examination of T.R. will not destroy the jury's perception that
Defendant is proceeding pro se.
(R., Vol. 2, p.203 (emphasis added).) The trial court found that having standby

counsel read the questions prepared by Folk to cross-examine T.R. would not
"unduly infringe upon [Folks'] right of self representation." (Id.) As noted, Folk
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had control over every other aspect of his trial, therefore, the jury would not have
been confused over whether he was representing himself.
Folk has failed to show any error in the trial court's findings in regard to
the two-prong test of McKaskle. Having Folk write cross-examination questions
out for his standby counsel to read did not deny Folk the ability to actually control
the case he presented to the jury. He had total control over every other facet of
his trial, and drafted the questions asked of the one witness he was not allowed

13 In Fields, the Fourth Circuit held that a defendant's right to personally crossexamine the witnesses against him could be restricted if the purposes of the selfrepresentation right would have been "otherwise assured," and if denial of
personal cross-examination was necessary to further an important public policy.
Fields, 49 F.3d at 1035.
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to be present with. Nor did the "written question" procedure ordered to crossexamine TR. destroy the jury's perception that he was representing himself.
McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178.
Additionally, the trial court mirrored Fields' finding that "'[t]he State's
interest here in protecting child sexual abuse victims from the emotional trauma
of being cross-examined by their alleged abuser is at least as great as, and likely
greater than, the State's interest in Craig of protecting children from the
emotional harm of merely having to testify in their alleged abuser's presence.'"
(R., Vol. 2, p.203 (quoting Fields, 49 F.3d at 1036) (emphasis added).) In light of
the State's great interest in protecting TR. from trauma caused by crossexamination by Folk, the trauma likely to affect TR. if Folk was allowed to
personally cross-examine him,14 and because the method of TR.'s crossexamination meets the McKaskle test, Folk has failed to show the trial court
erred.
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IV.
Folk Has Failed To Demonstrate The Trial Court Erred By Its Answer To The
JUry'S Question About Instruction Sixteen

A.

Introduction
After the jury began deliberating, the jury sent the judge a written question

which read:

14 The factors listed in regard to whether Folk's right to confrontation was
violated by TR. testifying through closed circuit video apply equally, if not more,
to Folk's self-representation claim that he should have been permitted to
personally cross-examine TR. For the sake of brevity, the state relies on its
argument presented in § II D, supra.
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Your Honor, referring to Instruction 16, No. #3; are we
proving oral, genital contact or is this an issue of any lewd and
lascivious conduct. Is this a matter of John doing oral sex with
[T. R.] or any type of sexual advancement. If lewd and lascivious is
the case, what a [sic] definition of lewd and lascivious.
(R., Vol. 2, p.270.)

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

The district court sent the jury the following clarifying

instruction:
"Lewd and Liscivious [sic] Conduct" is the statutory name for
a category of sexual touching crimes which include oral-genital
contact, genital-genital contact, genital-anal contact, manual-genital
contact, manual-anal contact, oral-anal contact, etc. Here the
allegation is oral-genital (mouth to penis) contact, which is, by
definition, lewd and lascivious conduct.
(Tr. p.742, L. 25 - p.743, L.7(emphasis added).) Folk objected to the inclusion of
the word "etc." by asking the trial judge to remove it his answer.

(Tr., p.743,

Ls.15-18) The trial judge denied Folk's request, explaining he kept "etc." in his
clarifying instruction in order to track the lewd conduct statute by not only
including all the combinations listed, but to also reflect that the list is not
exclusive. 15 (Tr., p.743, L.21- p.744, L.5.)
On appeal, Folk argues "the district court denied him his right to due
process of law by instructing the jury that lewd conduct may be committed by
making any type of sexual advance upon the victim when it refused to remove
the let cetera' from the clarifying instruction." (Appellant's Brief, p.70.) However,
Folk misconstrues the trial court's clarifying instruction, and ignores its plain
directive that the jury only consider the allegation that Folk had oral-genital
contact with T. R. The instructions did not misstate the law or confuse the jury

15 I.C. § 18-1508 defines lewd and lascivious acts upon a minor under sixteen as
"including but not limited to" the various combinations of sexual contact listed.
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about what conduct was alleged to constitute the crime of lewd and lascivious
conduct.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844
P.2d 691, 694 (1992); Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 265, 16 P.3d 937, 941 (Ct.
App. 2000). To be reversible error, any error in the jury instructions must have
misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho
970,977, 188 P.3d 912, 919 (2008); State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303,310,955 P.2d
1082, 1089 (1998).
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C.

Folk Has Failed To Show Any Error, Much Less Prejudicial Error, In The
Trial Court's Clarifying Instruction
In essence, the jury's written question to the trial court asked two things:

(a) what constitutes lewd and lascivious conduct? and (b) what specific act of
lewd conduct was Folk alleged to have committed? The court's response first
informed the jury of the specific combinations of physical contact that are
statutorily defined as lewd conduct, then let the jury know, in attempting to follow
the statute, that the list is not exclusive by inserting "etc." at the end of the litany.
(Tr. p.742, L. 25 - p.743, L.5.)

In addressing the jury's question about what

specific lewd conduct Folk was charged with committing ("Is this a matter of John
doing oral sex with [T.R.] or any type of sexual advancement"), the trial court did
not mince words: "Here the allegation is oral-genital (mouth to penis) contact,
which is, by definition, lewd and lascivious conduct." (Tr. p.743, Ls.5-7.) The
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clarity of that statement needs no interpretation or parsing -- Folk was accused of
having "oral-genital (mouth to penis) contact" with T.R. 16
It is well established that jurors are presumed to have followed
instructions.

See, e.g., Packard v. Joint School Dist. No. 171, 104 Idaho 604,

612, 661 P.2d 770, 778 (Ct. App. 1983) ([W]here jury instructions are clear, an
appellate court will presume that the jurors have heeded the instructions given by
the trial court."); State v. Brown, 53 Idaho 576,585,26 P.2d 131, 135 (1933) ("[I]t
must be presumed that the jurors observed and applied the instructions given
them."). There is no basis for believing that the trial court's written answer to the
jury's question was inadequate where the jury was last given the directive, "Here
the allegation is oral-genital (mouth to penis) contact, which is, by definition, lewd
I.~
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and lascivious conduct."

Folk has failed to demonstrate any error in the trial

court's clarifying instruction.

Folk states: "The district court denied Mr. Folk's request and gave the jurors
the instruction authorizing it to find sexual advancement included in the conduct
prohibited under the lewd conduct statute." (Appellant's Brief, p.72.) Folk's
contention that "etc." in the court's response referred to "any type of sexual
advancement" mentioned in the jury's question is conclusory and unfounded.
There is nothing in the trial court's response that connects "etc." to the phrase
"any type of sexual advancement" in the jury's question. The question asked by
the jury was in the disjunctive, "Is this a matter of John doing oral sex with [T.R.]
or any type of sexual advancement." (R., Vol. 2, p.270 (emphasis added).) The
trial court clarified which of the two types of conduct posited by the jury
constituted the crime Folk was charged with committing -- "Here the allegation is
oral-genital (mouth to penis) contact .... " (Tr. p.743, Ls.5-7.)
16
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v.
Folk Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To This
Case
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453,872 P.2d 708,716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error.

State v.

Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Folk has failed to show
that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and therefore the doctrine is
inapplicable to this case. See, e.g., LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 121,937
P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been shown, they
would not amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal. State v.
Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella,
135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors
deemed harmless).
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Folk's judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 1yth day of August 2010.
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